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Trade Mark Infringement or Unfair Commercial Conduct? The 
Complications of Case C-129/17 “Mitsubishi” 
* Shehan Parimalam 
Abstract The protection of IP rights has always caused friction between the interests of 
rightsholders and consumers. To aid in alleviating this tension, the various branches of IP law 
have developed their own doctrines of exhaustion. Regarding European Union (“EU”) trade 
mark law, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) authoritatively considers the 
EU Trade Mark Directive (“EUTMD”) and EU Trade Mark Regulation (“EUTMR”) as 
adopting a model of regional exhaustion. However, the author considers that following Case 
C-129/17 “Mitsubishi”, the CJEU has illegitimately extended the scope of EU trade mark law 
to cover situations that, when properly considered, ought to be dealt with under the national 
laws of EU Member States as unfair competition issues. The following exposition shall 
substantiate this claim. 
1. Introduction 
The primary function of a trade mark is to provide consumers with information  relating 
to the commercial origin of its goods and/or services. This informs consumers’ purchasing 
decisions when faced with competing products in the marketplace. The primary function is 
even more important when considering the EU’s focus on removing barriers to free trade. 
Theoretically, anyone can penetrate any product market1 and thus, the profitability of an 
undertaking is intrinsically linked with its ability to distinguish itself within the relevant 
market. Ergo, the protection of an undertaking’s “brand image” constitutes an integral part of 
ensuring fair and effective competition. Nevertheless, the importance of adopting a holistic 
approach to maintain unfettered competition must not be underestimated. To grant unlimited 
monopolies to trade mark proprietors would be counterproductive as dominant undertakings 
could influence innovation, prices, and barriers to entry within their respective market(s) 
leading to the detriment of potential competitors and ultimately, consumers. It is the constant 
pursuit of balancing these polarised considerations—which aim to achieve the same goal that 
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ought to be at the forefront of the minds of policymakers and judges while considering trade 
mark legislation/disputes. 
Within this dynamic lies the role of the parallel importer2 who acts simultaneously as a 
consumer and seller of trade marked goods. There are many arguments for and against the 
legalisation of parallel imports but, presently, it is sufficient to say that the CJEU’s ‘Europe 
First’ approach3 towards trade marks and international trade promotes double remuneration for 
trade mark proprietors at the detriment of overall consumer welfare. This case comment shall 
further highlight the CJEU’s disregard for the degree of control that trade mark proprietors 
have over their IP rights internationally. 
1. The ‘Mitsubishi’ issue 
The territorial nature of national trade mark law, the existence of cross-border trade 
tariffs, and disparities in labour costs and Gross Domestic Product per capita, i.e. the measure 
of a country’s total economic output divided by its total population,4 leads to the creation of 
separate national markets for identical (or substitutable) products made by the same 
undertaking. This causes significant price discrimination. This presents a lucrative business 
opportunity to enterprising individuals– legitimately produced trade marked goods can be 
bought at a much lower price in one country and then resold in another country at a profit. This 
is the essence of parallel importing.5 
Many arguments exist for and against parallel importing. Proponents of the former view 
argue that parallel importing leads to a direct increase in consumer welfare,6 aids by eliminating 
“gold-plating” and other tying practices by dominant manufacturers,7 and results in no real 
provable loss of profits to manufacturers and rightsholders.8 On the other hand, parallel 
importing is seen as  liable to cause consumer confusion,9 encourage “free riding” to the 
 
2 By reference to the term ‘parallel importer’, the author is only referring to a reseller of lawfully made and 
purchased trade marked goods, and not any entity dealing with counterfeit products. 
3 A Zappalaglio, ‘International Exhaustion of Trade marks and Parallel Imports in the US and the EU: How to 
Achieve Symmetry’ (2015) 5 QMJIP 68, 75, 83 – 84 
4 K Amadeo, ‘What is GDP per capita?’ (Updated 22nd June 2020) <https://www.thebalance.com/gdp-per-capita-
formula-u-s-compared-to-highest-and-lowest-3305848>, accessed 24th June 2020 
5 MJ Davison, ‘Parallel Importing: Unlawful Use of Trade Marks’ (1990) 19 FLR 420, 420 
6 K Scholes, ‘Parallel Importing’ (1997) 6 CLR 564, 583; Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons Inc 586 US 519 
(2013). 
7 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp and Others v Commission of the European Communities and Others 
(“Microsoft”) ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. 
8 Scholes (n 6) 583 – 584. 
9 Colgate Palmolive Ltd v Markwell Finance Ltd [1989] RPC 497; Scholes (n 6) 581. 
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detriment of manufacturers and rightsholders,10 reduce profit margins and consequently harm 
innovation,11 and allow pirated goods to proliferate the market more easily.12 
Adding to this already tumultuous situation are the notions of de-branding, i.e., where 
trade marked goods are genericised through the removal of their trade marks and rebranding 
which replaces those marks with the marks of another undertaking to create a sui generis form 
of reverse passing off.13 This was precisely what the CJEU was confronted with in 
“Mitsubishi”.14 
1.1.  Facts and Issues 
The First Claimant, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd (“Mitsubishi”), manages the 
worldwide trade mark portfolio of the Mitsubishi Group. It owns the following trade marks: an 
EUTM for the word “MITSUBISHI”, a figurative EUTM , inter alia, for motor vehicles, 
electric vehicles and forklift trucks,15 and  two Benelux trade marks which are identical to the 
former EUTMs. The Second Claimant, Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Europe BV (“MCFE”), 
is the exclusive manufacturer of Mitsubishi forklifts within the EEA. They were also 
exclusively authorised to sell and provide aftersales support of those forklifts within the EEA. 
The First Defendant, Duma Forklifts NV (“Duma”), is engaged in the worldwide 
purchase and sale of new and used forklifts manufactured, inter alia, by Mitsubishi. 
Additionally, Duma manufactures its own forklifts under the names “GSI”, “GS”, and “Duma”, 
and is a wholesale supplier of forklifts and other machinery both inside and outside the EEA. 
Until the mid-1990s, Duma was one of Mitsubishi’s authorised dealers for forklifts in Belgium. 
The Second Defendant, GS International BVBA (“GSI”), is affiliated with Duma, and builds 
and repairs forklifts for wholesale international import and export. It also modifies forklifts to 
conform with the EU regulations and, in doing so, provides them with their own serial numbers. 
 
10 L Telser, ‘Why Should Manufacturers want Fair Trade?’ (1960) 3 JLE 86, Scholes, (n 6), 581 – 582 
11 Davison, (n 5), 440; Scholes, (n 6), 582 
12 Scholes, (n 6), 582 – 583 
13 On the notion of passing off, see Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731 and 
Reckitt and Coleman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491. On reverse passing off in particular, see 
John Robert Powers School Inc and Others v Denyse Bernadette Tessensohn [1995] FSR 947. 
14 Case C-129/17 Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd and Another v Duma Forklifts NV and Another (“Mitsubishi”) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:594 
15 “Vehicles; apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water”, 
<https://www.wipo.int/classifications/nice/nclpub/en/fr/?basic_numbers=show&class_number=12&explanatory
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Since 2009, Duma and GSI have lawfully purchased forklifts from Mitsubishi and 
MCFE’s authorised sellers, placed them in a customs warehouse, and: [1] wholly de-branded 
them; [2] modified them to conform with EU regulations; [3] rebranded them with their own 
logos, identification plates, and serial numbers; and [4] imported them into the EEA for sale. 
Mitsubishi and MCFE argued that Duma and GSI’s conduct should be prohibited under 
EU trade mark law since the predecessors to both the EUTMD’s and the EUTMR’s exclusive 
rights provisions16 should be interpreted as prohibiting the de-branding and rebranding of trade 
marked goods that have yet to be placed on the market within the EEA.17 Furthermore, they 
argued that the prohibited conduct under Article 5(3) of the EUTMD (2008) and Article 9(2) 
of the EUTMR(2009) should not be construed as a closed list. This is especially when 
considering third party conduct aimed at circumventing a trade mark proprietor’s exclusive 
right to control the first sale of their goods within the EEA.18 They also contended  that 
consumers would recognise their forklifts despite Duma and GSI’s actions, thereby affecting 
the functions of their trade marks.19 
Duma and GSI responded by stating that their actions did not, upon any reasonable 
interpretation, constitute use of any sign identical or similar to Mitsubishi and MCFE’s trade 
marks, since those were removed prior to their sale within the EEA.20 Essentially, trade mark 
proprietors should only be permitted to oppose the first sale of goods bearing their trade mark 
at the time of sale.21 
2. First objection – Contrary to EUTMD and EUTMR 
2.1. Non-use 
The Advocate-General (“AG”) emphasised the need to consider whether Duma and 
GSI’s actions could properly be classed as “use” EU trade mark law.22 In response to the 
aforementioned, the AG considered that a semantical analysis of the word “use” indicated that 
 
16 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22nd October 2008 to approximate the 
laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ L299/25, Article 5, L299/28 – L299/29; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26th February 2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L78/1, Article 9, 
L78/5 
17 Case C-129/17, Opinion of Advocate-General Campos Sánchez-Bordona (“AG Opinion”) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:292, [29] 
18 ibid., [30] 
19 ibid., [31] 
20 ibid., [32] 
21 ibid., [33] 
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the term includes some form of positive act  ‘to utilise an article for something’, which is 
diametrically opposed to the removal of a trade mark from a product.23 Thus, whilst Articles 
5(3) EUTMD and 9(2) EUTMR are not exhaustive, it is only logical that the removal of a trade 
mark is not covered by them.24 
 
The CJEU, however, disagreed with this view, and whilst not explicitly addressing the 
issue in terms of “use” or lack thereof, chose simply to state that any act that interfered with a 
trade mark’s essential function25 with a view to sell products in the EEA ought to be regarded 
as “use in the course of trade”.26 Examining the language used in both Article 5 of the EUTMD 
(2008) and Article 9 of the EUTMR (2009), the author considers that CJEU’s decision is flawed 
as it is contrary to the spirit and wording of the legislation. The following sub-sections shall 
substantiate this claim. 
2.1.1. “Use” 
A semantical analysis indicates that the word “use”, as a verb, can have four 
meanings:27 [1] to put something to a particular purpose; [2] to reduce or finish something, 
usually by way of a chemical process or through eating/drinking; [3] to say or write particular 
words or phrases; or [4] to take advantage of, or exploit, a person or situation. 
Regardless, all four iterations clearly indicate that “use” requires action, rather than 
inaction, vis-á-vis the thing it is applied or related to. Thus, within the context of trade mark 
law, “use” should mean any act that results in some form of representation of that mark, or a 
sign identical/similar to it, to consumers on goods and/or services.28 Both the open-ended list 
of uses in the EUTMD and the EUTMR29 and the fact that a trade mark, unlike a registered 
 
23 ibid., [50] – [53] 
24 ibid., [55] 
25 Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed (“Arsenal”) ECLI:EU:C:2002:651, [48] – a trade 
mark’s essential function is to indicate the commercial origin of particular goods or services. 
26 “Mitsubishi”, (n 14), [48] 
27 Cambridge English Dictionary Online <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/use>, accessed 13th 
July 2020 
28 F Angelini and SV Galletti, ‘If You Remove It, You Use It: The Court of Justice of the European Union on 
Debranding – On the Mitsubishi v Duma Judgement by the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2019) 109 
TMR 875, 877 
29 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16th December 2015 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (“EUTMD”) [2015] OJ L336/1, Article 
10(3)(a) – (f), L336/11; Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14th June 
2017 on the European Union trade mark (“EUTMR”) [2017] OJ L154/1, Article 9(3)(a) – (f), L154/11; J Mellor 
QC et al, Kerly’s Law of Trade marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 16th ed, 2017) (“Kerly”), §16-014 
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design (“RCD”),30 must be registered for specific goods and/or services, further confirms this 
interpretation.31 
The EUTMD and the EUTMR provide that a trade mark proprietor must put their mark 
to “genuine use” within a five-year period following its registration, unless there are proper 
reasons for non-use.32 Using a mark in a form that does not alter its distinctive character, as 
well as affixing it to packaging and goods solely for international exportation, are specifically 
regarded as situations of “genuine use”.33 Furthermore, “genuine use” must be more than 
merely tokenistic, consistent with a trade mark’s essential function – it must entail use of the 
mark on the market for the goods and services it is applied to.34 This clearly indicates the need 
for some form of positive action in order for a finding of “use” to be made – the author submits 
that a proprietor using their trade mark in the “Mitsubishi” sense could legitimately be subject 
to invalidation proceedings for non-use. 
The absence of any provisions under EU trade mark law concerning de-branding must 
be taken to indicate the legislative intent to exclude such conduct from the trade mark regime. 
The divergent treatment of de-branding under the national laws of Member States demonstrates 
that, in order to constitute an actionable ground of trade mark infringement, an express 
provision must be made.35 In the absence of such express provision, debranding has been 
decisively rejected as a form of actionable use for the purposes of trade mark infringement.36 
Furthermore, both the EUTMD and the EUTMR provide that their application is without 
prejudice to the rights of aggrieved parties to seek redress under national unfair competition 
laws,37 thereby recognising that any such legislation is separate and distinct from EU trade 
mark law, and remains unharmonized. Consequently, it is submitted that EU trade mark law 
 
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12th December 2001 on Community designs (“CDR”) [2002] OJ L3/1, 
Article 36(6), L3/11 
31 EUTMD, (n 44), Article 37(1)(c), L336/18; EUMTR, (n 44), Article 31(1)(c), L154/18 
32 EUTMD, (n 44), Article 16(1), L336/13; EUTMR, (n 44), Article 18(1), L154/13 
33 EUTMD, (n 44), Article 16(5), L336/13; EUTMR, (n 44), Article 18(1), L154/13 
34 Case C-40/01 Ansul BV v Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV (“Ansul”) ECLI:EU:C:2003:145, [36] – [37]; Case C-
259/02 La Mer Technology Inc v Laboratories Goemar SA (“La Mer”) ECLI:EU:C:2004:50, [27]; Case T-300/12 
Lidl Stiftung & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIIM) 
(“Lidl”) ECLI:EU:T:2014:864, [26] & [53] 
35 The French IP Code expressly states that the removal of a lawfully affixed trade mark constitutes a form of 
trade mark infringement. See Code de la propriété intellectuelle, Article L713-2. 
36 Both the UK and Germany have rejected the notion that de-branding equates to use of a trade mark. See 
Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Another v Swingward Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 83, [51] – [53] (Jacob LJ) and BGH, 
Judgement of 12th July 2007, I ZR 148/04 (“CORDARONE”), [24].  
37 EUTMD, (n 44), Recital 40, L336/6; EUTMR, (n 44), Article 17(2), L154/13 
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cannot and should not be interpreted to “fill the gaps” resulting from lack of EU harmonisation 
of unfair competition, unlike the US’ Lanham Act.38 
2.1.2. “In the Course of Trade” 
The CJEU’s observation on the relevance of the Defendants’ de-branding and 
rebranding of the goods within a customs warehouse procedure is subject to less criticism since 
it satisfies both requirements noted in “Arsenal”,39 namely that such use must take place in the 
context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter. 
However, in the absence of both “use” and identity/similarity, this conclusion makes little 
difference, since an action for infringement must be premised on proof of all the constituent 
elements contained in the legislation. Furthermore, relying too heavily on the “Arsenal” test 
creates backdoor harmonisation of unfair competition law within the EU, since it allows trade 
mark proprietors to claim trade mark “infringement” to combat commercial acts, rather than 
those legitimately threatening their IP rights;40 differences will always exist in the treatment of 
such acts within various EU Member States until the treatment of such conduct is harmonised 
via legislative action.41 As so often is the case, the CJEU’s relative inexperience in specialist 
subject matter is highlighted due to its over-enthusiasm to maintain the integrity of EU laws 
and customs.42 
2.1.3. “Identical or Similar” 
The AG noted that Duma and GSI did not rebrand the forklifts with a sign identical or 
similar to that used by Mitsubishi or MCFE.43 The CJEU itself conceded that the Defendants 
did not use any signs identical or similar to the trade mark at any point,44 choosing to focus 
wholly on its observation that de-branding alone constituted interference with the trade mark’s 
 
38 15 USC §1051 et seq. 
39 Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed (“Arsenal”) ECLI:EU:C:2002:651, [40]; Kerly, (n 
44), §16-033 
40 Angelini and Galletti, (n 43), 883 
41 “AG Opinion”, (n 37), [91] 
42 There is a dearth of case law by the CJEU which purports to resolve issues in the interpretation of competition 
law within the EU under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”). However, many such cases appear to create more confusion instead from a competition perspective. 
For a brief discussion on one such case where the CJEU overemphasised the integrity of the internal market and 
harmonisation over those of consumer welfare and unfettered competition, see S Parimalam, ‘Vertical 
Agreements, ATP, and Minimum RPM – Revisiting on of EU Competition Law’s Oldest Fallacies’ (2019) 1 
Lincoln’s Inn Student Law Journal 53. Readers are also directed to A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law: 
Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP, 6th ed, 2016). 
43 “AG Opinion”, (n 37), [32] 
44 “Mitsubishi”, (n 14), [41] 
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functions.45 This creates a logical fallacy, since it implies a finding of infringement without the 
need for a third party’s actions to have any correlation to a trade mark. This, in turn, 
amalgamates trade mark protection with that provided by other IP rights by permitting acts 
interfering with the physical goods themselves to constitute infringement. 
This fully contradicts the underlying rationale for granting trade mark protection. Trade 
marks must indicate the commercial origin of the goods or services they are applied to.46 
Nothing more, nothing less. Rewarding of inventive or creative efforts is a matter for other 
areas of IP law. Patents protect manufacturers of any novel product or process of industrial 
application involving an inventive step.47 Authors can rely on copyright law under the InfoSoc 
Directive48 and related jurisprudence by the CJEU49 to protect their expressions of creative 
freedom. RCDs provide patent-style protection on similar terms for designers.50 Consumers 
may associate certain trade marks with better quality products, but those marks themselves 
cannot add any substantial value to the goods they are applied to.51 
2.1.4. Effect on Functions 
“Use” infringes if it is effects the functions of a trade mark,52 i.e., if any particular act 
by a third party were to disturb the very essence for which a trade mark is affixed to goods or 
used in relation to services. In “Mitsubishi”, however, this connection was never present – a 
trade mark can only perform its functions if it remains visible on goods for consumers to see.53 
De-branding trade marked goods with a view to parallel importation deprives proprietors of 
 
45 ibid., [42] – [43] 
46 Zappalaglio, (n 3), 77; C Fink, ‘Entering the Jungle of Intellectual Property Rights Exhaustion and Parallel 
Importation’ in C Fink and KE Maskus, Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from a Recent Economic 
Research (OUP 2005), 174 
47 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 1973, as revised by 
the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000 
(“EPC”), Article 52(1) 
48 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22nd May 2001 on the harmonisation 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (“InfoSoc Directive”) [2001] OJ 
L167/10 
49 Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (“Infopaq”) ECLI:EU:C:2009:465; Case 
C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others (“Painer”) ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 
50 CDR, (n 45) 
51 EUTMD, (n 44), Article 4(1)(e)(iii), L336/7; EUMTR, (n 44), Article 7(1)(e)(iii), L154/8 
52 Kerly, (n 44), §16-043; Case C-63/97 Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald 
Karel Deenik (“BMW v Deenik”) ECLI:EU:C:1999:82, [38]. In Case C-487/07 L’Oréal SA and Others v Bellure 
NV and Others (“L’Oréal”) ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, the CJEU noted that a trade mark’s additional functions 
include guaranteeing the quality of godos and services, as well as communication, investment, and advertising. 
53 Angelini and Galletti, (n 43), 882 – 883; C Gielen, ‘Debranding: A form of Trade mark Infringement? A 
Discussion of the CJEU Decision in Mitsubishi/Duma’ (2019) 41 EIPR 605, 606 
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their ability to claim additional remuneration for those goods54 on the basis of an incorrectly 
interpreted legal fiction.55 It does not deprive them of their exclusive rights per se, which have 
already been lawfully exercised upon first sale. 
A trade mark’s additional functions are merely subsets of its essential function. The 
CJEU itself notes this truism – “[A] trade mark is always supposed to fulfil its function of 
indicating origin, whereas it performs its other functions only insofar as its proprietor uses it to 
that end”.56 Thus, the preferable view is to consider only interference with a trade mark’s 
essential function as actionable; the needless expansion of a trade mark’s functions to include 
legal protection for the myriad of ways it might be used as an instrument of commercial strategy 
is unnecessary from a trade mark perspective. By detracting from the rationale for trade mark 
protection,57 “Mitsubishi” promotes the delegitimization of trade mark protection in the eyes 
of the public and consumers. 
2.2. Wrongful Consideration of Exhaustion Doctrine 
At the outset, the CJEU considered de-branding as irreconcilable with the EU’s 
conception of exhaustion since it prevents proprietors from controlling the first sale of goods 
bearing their mark.58 However, by its own admission, it recognised that Duma and GSI never 
sold the forklifts within the EEA under Mitsubishi or MCFE’s  trade marks.59 Herein lies 
another logical fallacy – exhaustion and its exemptions can only be applied where some nexus 
exists between the trade mark and the goods as first sold within the EEA, not as an independent 
concept in its own right. 
The CJEU’s jurisprudence from “Silhouette”60 to “Van Doren + Q”61 all indicate that 
exhaustion is a defence available to a third party accused of reselling products within the EEA 
bearing a trade mark, or a sign which is identical or similar to it. Those cases also illustrate the 
onerous conditions a third party must comply to rely on such a defence, and further stipulate 
that this defence applies in such a manner to wholly prohibit parallel importation within the 
 
54 Angelini and Galletti, (n 43), 882 
55 See Section 2(2), below 
56 Case C-323/09 Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer plc (“Interflora”) ECLI:EU:C:2011:604, [40] 
57 See Section 2(1)(c), below 
58 “Mitsubishi”, (n 14), [44] 
59 ibid., [41] 
60 Case C-355/96 Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH 
(“Silhouette”) ECLI:EU:C:1998:374 
61 Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q. GmbH v Lifestyle sports + sportswear Handelsgesellschaft mbH and another 
(“Van Doren + Q”) ECLI:EU:C:2003:204 
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EEA.62 However, those cases are distinguishable from “Mitsubishi” in two respects. Firstly, 
the Defendants in all those cases alleged that the exhaustion doctrine provided them with a 
defence, unlike in “Mitsubishi”.63 Secondly, those cases concerned the instances where 
exhaustion was found inapplicable to ensure that proprietors retained control over their trade 
mark as affixed on those goods, not the goods in abstracto. 
Whilst both the EUTMD and the EUTMR have harmonised national trade mark laws 
to adopt regional exhaustion, they make no indication as to whether such exhaustion is the 
minimum standard, or the ultimate one.64 The author considers the former view to be 
preferable. Bearing in mind the author’s earlier submission that a trade mark’s additional 
functions are a subset of its essential function, the economic value of a trade mark should 
simply be the fair price attributable to it for designating the commercial origin of goods or 
services. Ex hypothesi, since all trade marks must be capable of making this distinction, the 
amount added to the sale price of a product on this basis must be the same for every registered 
trade mark. This would reflect the truism that any differences in consumer preference are based 
on the differences in the specific characteristics of the goods themselves, rather than due to the 
particular trade mark(s) they bear. 
3. Second objection – incomplete theory of harm 
In “Mitsubishi”, the CJEU’s decision was heavily premised on Mitsubishi and MCFE’s 
allegation that Duma and GSI’s actions were calculated to circumvent its jurisprudence 
enjoining parallel imports within the EEA, while the AG’s opinion was predominantly based 
on the lack of use by them. The lack of any actual or potential harm from a trade mark 
perspective has already been discussed.65 The forthcoming discussion shall endeavour to show 
that a similar lack of harm arises when considering the usual objections66 to parallel importing. 
3.1. Consumer Confusion 
Unlike the situation in Colgate, the Duma and GSI actively disassociated Mitsubishi 
and MCFE’s trade mark from the goods. Furthermore, nothing in either the AG’s opinion or 
the CJEU’s decision indicates that consumers would still recognise the Claimants’ goods after 
 
62 Zappalaglio, (n 3), 73 – 75 
63 AG Opinion, (n 37), [30] 
64 T Hays, Parallel Importation Under EU Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 296 
65 See Section 2(1)(b) – (c), above 
66 supra, (n 9) – (n 12) 
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the Defendants’ rebranding and thus, lead to any perception of a commercial link between the 
parties. 
3.2. “Free Riding” 
In rebranding the goods with their own signs and marks, the Defendants assumed 
complete responsibility over their sale.67 Consumers would purchase the rebranded forklifts 
from them based on their professional reputation, and not that of the Claimants. With regards 
to the CJEU’s ruling, nevertheless, the Defendants’ actions affected the Claimants’ right to the 
development of any future reputation/goodwill using their trade mark originally affixed on the 
goods, whilst such considerations might form the basis of an objection under unfair competition 
law,68 they remain outside the scope of EU trade mark law.69 
3.3. Lack of Incentivisation for Innovation 
Whilst it is true that every forklift that the Defendant sells within the EEA may 
constitute one less sale for the Claimants within the EEA, reduced profit margins are not the 
concern of IP law. Trade mark protection is one element within the overall objective of 
undistorted competition, but it is not a substitute or miracle cure for the lacunae in the EU’s 
competition regime.  Additionally, the Defendants are selling original goods lawfully 
purchased in a third country – the selling price of those goods, as determined by the Claimants 
or any economically linked undertaking(s), would (and should) already have accounted for all 
the relevant IP rights associated with their production. Ergo, the proceeds of such sale(s) have 
already remunerated the Claimants. 
3.4. Black Market Proliferation 
The Defendants did not seek to sell the goods under the Claimants’ trade mark. The 
question of whether they might find it easier to sell pirated versions of the Claimants’ goods 
alongside their parallel imports only become relevant when both types of goods bear similar or 
identical trade marks and signs. At present, if the Defendants were to sell such pirated goods, 
the Claimants would have no harder task of rooting out such illegality than if they would with 
any other counterfeiter. 
 
67 AG Opinion, (n 37), [43] 
68 Gielen, (n 68), 607 
69 See Section 2(1), above 
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4. Third objection – No competitive advantages 
The author’s third objection against the CJEU’s decision requires further appreciation 
of the three main economic schools rationalising competition protection. The Harvard School 
contends that the structure of any given market determines the conduct of undertakings 
operating within it, which in turn influences the performance within that market (“SCP 
theory”).70 The Chicago School emphasises the importance of consumers within the market, 
whilst theorising that market deficiencies are self-correcting.71 In other words, the overarching 
objective of competition law ought to be the pursuit of efficiency, but does not seem to 
accurately define whose efficiency ought to be protected. Finally, the Austrian School suggests 
that individuals place their own, subjective value on particular goods, i.e., the marginal utility 
of those goods, which then influences their value, as opposed to the labour inputs for those 
goods.72 As such, competition in innovation will always be more important than price 
competition, since it constitutes a more effective means of obtaining a competitive 
advantage.73Despite these differing rationales, the author suggests that a central theme of all 
three approaches is common – some form of advantage to consumers, either in the form of 
lower prices or technologically superior products through a combination of protecting 
consumers and competitors accordingly. Recognising this, the CJEU’s competition 
jurisprudence74 has consistently referenced the need to protect not only the interests of 
individual competitors or consumers, but also the structure of the market and the competition 
as such.75 
“Mitsubishi” is at odds with this, however, since despite repeating the often-quoted 
mantra that trade mark law constitutes an indispensable part of the system of maintaining 
unfettered competition within the EEA, the CJEU’s decision does nothing to advance consumer 
welfare. In fact, it directly hinders such welfare. 
4.1. Unjustified Double Remuneration 
 
70 A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP, 6th ed, 2016), 13 
71 ibid., 14 
72 C Menger, Principles of Economics (Reprinted, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007) 
73 JA Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper, 1942) 
74 See generally: Case 27/76 United Brands Company and Another v Commission of the European Communities 
(“United Brands”) ECLI:EU:C:1978:22; Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v Teliasonera Sverige AB 
(“Teliasonera”) ECLI:EU:C:2011:83; Case C-95/04P British Airways v Commission of the European 
Communities (“British Airways”) ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 
75 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad van bestuur can de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (“T-Mobile”) ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, [38] 
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As noted above, the Defendants’ conduct did not cause any loss of incentivisation to 
the Claimants – the latter were already commensurately rewarded during the first sale of the 
goods.76 However, by delegitimising the Defendants’ conduct, the CJEU has inadvertently 
rubber-stamped the provision of double remuneration for trade mark proprietors without the 
need for them to show any provable loss or harm. The CJEU created an amalgamated right 
whereby non-use can be regarded as use and where infringement can occur even without any 
nexus between a third party’s conduct and a proprietor’s trade mark, without ever elaborating 
on why such a right is necessary from either an IP or competition perspective. This course of 
action is ill-advised as it effectively protects businesses against bad commercial decisions; this 
should never be a concern for any law. 
4.2. No Advantages to Competitors or Consumers 
The absence of any actual or potential harm from either a trade mark or an economic 
perspective, coupled with the lack of justifications for ensuring double remuneration for the 
Claimants, could be “cured” if estopping the Defendants resulted in some advantages to 
consumers. Yet, this is not the case: consumers would be deprived of choosing between the 
Claimants’ forklifts and the Defendants’ forklifts and of the price competition and variations 
in aftermarket support etc. that this would entail. They would be forced to purchase only the 
Claimants’ forklifts – therefore, if the Claimants are a market dominant player, consumers 
would be at their mercy. Arguing that competition law will then get involved to protect 
consumers is akin to closing the door after the horse has bolted. Additionally, preventing the 
Defendants from engaging in such conduct is directly detrimental to competitors, since it 
creates an artificial barrier to entry. 
5.  Practical Significance 
The author considers “Mitsubishi” as contrary to the accepted notions of EU trade mark 
law. Furthermore, it presents no discernible issues associated traditionally with parallel 
importing or EU competition law. It appears that the CJEU has finally been confronted with a 
clear case of unfair competitive acts by an undertaking and, in struggling to find a solution 
within the EU law, has decided to unjustly extend the scope of trade mark infringement. Unfair 
competition, as noted above, still remains within the remit of the national laws of EU Member 
States, and any changes to the commune acquis must start with an amendment to the EU 
 
76 See Section 3(3), above 
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Treaties, followed by the adoption of Regulations and/or Directives by the EU Legislature. It 
would be ill-advised for the CJEU to overstep its authority and attempt backdoor 
harmonisation, but it would not be the first time in either IP law or competition law where it 
has appeared to do so, presumably due to a lack of appreciation of the nuances in those areas. 
In any case, careful analysis must be undertaken as to the true harm arising from 
debranding and rebranding lawfully made goods. A superficial analysis, such as that by the 
CJEU in “Mitsubishi”, which merely restates existing principles of law without tying them to 
the particular facts of the case, is of little use to anyone. The CJEU’s traditional “tunnel vision” 
approach towards developing the overall goals of the EU and protecting the integrity of its 
earlier decisions must be made to yield to common sense and new developments in business 
and technology. Any area of law stretched beyond its logical boundaries loses sight of its 
ultimate objective and, consequently, its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
The author’s view should not, however, be taken to suggest that trade mark proprietors 
must have their rights curtailed to less than what they have traditionally enjoyed. Rightsholders 
must be fairly rewarded for their ability to distinguish themselves from their competitors on 
the marketplace, but the rights that third parties have traditionally enjoyed must not be ignored. 
Neither party should enjoy an unjustified extension of their existing rights or liberties. The 
author also does not consider the promotion of consumer welfare to mean that everyone must 
be capable of purchasing every product available. However, they should not be so limited in 
their purchasing options such as to be wholly at the mercy of large (but not necessarily 
dominant) manufacturers and their authorised distributors. Nor should new businesses be 
prevented from utilising existing legal channels to establish themselves on any given market. 
